Monday, October 29, 2007
Enrolment
Enrolment officially starts today.. Get ready with your downpayment of P2,300.00 for second year students.. Unfortunately, the grades aren't available yet (Nego pa lang ang available as of 9am 10-30-07).. Good luck!
Monday, October 22, 2007
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Land Titles: Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals; July 5, 1996
Facts:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
Issue:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
Decision:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
Issue:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
Decision:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:
“Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.”Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
CASE DIGEST: Congson vs NLRC
FACTS:
The case was originally filed by herein respondents Bargo et al against Congson, the former being hired as piece-rate workers responsible for the loading/unloading of tuna catch for Southern Fishing Industry owned by the latter.
In 1990, the piece-rate workers were replaced with a new set of workers because of their alleged refusal/resistance to the proposed reduction of their piece-rate payment per tuna (the former rate was P1.00 per tuna movement. The reduction was proposed because of the decrease in the volume of tuna catch). They filed for underpayment of wages, contending that their average monthly rate did not exceed P1000, plus non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.
The labor arbiter decided in favor of the workers and directed Congson to pay the monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in toto, thus the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SEPARATION PAY?
2. W/N THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES SHOULD INCLUDE THE VALUE OF TUNA LIVER AND INTESTINES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE REPONDENT WORKERS AS PART OF THEIR COMPENSATION?
HELD:
1. YES. There being a substantive proof that the respondent workers are to be reinstated by their employer, the award for separation pay is appropriate. Separation pay may be given when the employer-employee relationship is to so tainted that reinstatement would not prosper.
2. NO. Article 102 par.1 of the Labor Code states that: Forms of payment. No employer shall pay the wages of an employee by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than legal tender, even when expressly requested by the employee. Thus, the computation made by the labor arbiter in arriving at the money claims is correct.
The case was originally filed by herein respondents Bargo et al against Congson, the former being hired as piece-rate workers responsible for the loading/unloading of tuna catch for Southern Fishing Industry owned by the latter.
In 1990, the piece-rate workers were replaced with a new set of workers because of their alleged refusal/resistance to the proposed reduction of their piece-rate payment per tuna (the former rate was P1.00 per tuna movement. The reduction was proposed because of the decrease in the volume of tuna catch). They filed for underpayment of wages, contending that their average monthly rate did not exceed P1000, plus non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.
The labor arbiter decided in favor of the workers and directed Congson to pay the monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in toto, thus the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SEPARATION PAY?
2. W/N THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES SHOULD INCLUDE THE VALUE OF TUNA LIVER AND INTESTINES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE REPONDENT WORKERS AS PART OF THEIR COMPENSATION?
HELD:
1. YES. There being a substantive proof that the respondent workers are to be reinstated by their employer, the award for separation pay is appropriate. Separation pay may be given when the employer-employee relationship is to so tainted that reinstatement would not prosper.
2. NO. Article 102 par.1 of the Labor Code states that: Forms of payment. No employer shall pay the wages of an employee by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than legal tender, even when expressly requested by the employee. Thus, the computation made by the labor arbiter in arriving at the money claims is correct.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
why banks rarely accept checks with two or more endorsements?
I found this article really helpful for my Negotiale Instruments Law subject:
THE EFFECT OF FORGERY IN CHECKS
By: Atty. Christopher E. Cruz
Do you ever wonder why banks rarely accept checks bearing two or more endorsements
for deposit to your account? No law requires banks to reject checks bearing two or more
endorsements. In fact, the law encourages the free transfer and negotiation of checks to other
parties in accordance with the principle of “accumulation of secondary contracts” of negotiable
instruments. As checks and other negotiable instruments are endorsed from one person to
another, the endorsers become debtors of the holder of the check. Thus, the more debtors there
are, the greater are the chances that the holder of the check can collect payment. If the law
allows numerous endorsements on checks, why then does your bank rarely honor checks
bearing two or more endorsements? The reason is because banks may also be endorsers.
Let us consider a hypothetical case: Jojo draws a check payable to the order of Manny
as payee with ABC bank as drawee. Without Manny’s knowledge, Ronald steals the check and
forges Manny’s signature, making it appear that Manny endorsed it to him. Ronald then
endorses the check and deposits the same in his own savings account with XYZ bank. XYZ
bank then presents the check for payment with ABC bank. ABC bank pays the amount to XYZ
bank which, in turn, credits it to the account of Ronald. Thereupon, forger Ronald withdraws the
amount and goes into hiding. In this case, who bears the loss, the drawer (Manny), the drawee
bank (ABC bank) or the collecting bank (XYZ bank)?
Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a forged signature in a check,
whether it be that of the drawer or the payee, is wholly inoperative and no one can gain title to
the instrument through it. A person whose signature was forged was never a party and never
consented to the contract. Thus, a forged endorsement does not operate as the payee’s
endorsement. However, this rule does not apply to a party who is precluded from setting up
forgery or want of authority. Who are these parties? They are those who warrant or admit the
genuineness of the forged signature and those who by their acts, silence or negligence, are
barred from setting up forgery. An endorser is an example of a party who is precluded from
setting up forgery as he warrants, among other things, that “the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be” (Sec. 65 (a), Negotiable Instruments Law).
Let us now apply the aforesaid rules to the present case. As between the drawer Jojo
and the drawee ABC bank, the latter is liable for the loss. Under the circumstances, ABC banką“is under strict liability to pay the check only to the order of Jojo as reflected on the face of the
check. Payment under the forged endorsement of Manny is not to Jojo’s order. By paying a
party other than to the order of Jojo, ABC bank failed to comply with the terms of the check. It
violated its duty to charge Jojo’s account only according to his order. Thus, as a general rule,
ABC bank may not debit Jojo’s account and must re-credit the amount of the check to his
account. However, if ABC bank can prove that Jojo substantially contributed to the making of
the forged signature, the latter is precluded from setting up forgery.
However, all is not lost for ABC bank since it was not Jojo’s signature that was forged
but Manny’s. In cases involving forged endorsements, the drawee ABC bank may not debit the
account of the drawer but may generally pass liability back through the collection chain to the
party who took it from the forger and, of course, to the forger himself, if available (Associated
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 620). Thus, ABC bank may seek reimbursement from
XYZ bank. Since Manny’s signature was forged, XYZ bank had no right to be paid by ABC
Bank. Furthermore, under Sec. 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a collecting bank like
XYZ Bank that endorses a check bearing a forged signature and presents it to the drawee ABC
bank is liable as an endorser. Thus, XYZ warrants the genuineness of all prior signatures and is
precluded from setting up forgery or want of authority. Thus, as between the drawer, the drawee
and the collecting bank, the collecting bank is ultimately liable for the loss.
Since the drawee ABC Bank is liable to the drawer Jojo, and the collecting bank XYZ
Bank, in turn, is liable to the drawee ABC Bank, can Jojo be allowed to directly collect from XYZ
Bank to simplify matters? Negative. There is no legal relationship between Jojo and XYZ Bank.
Jojo is not a client of XYZ Bank. While the procedure may be simpler, this legal shortcut is not
permissible.
You now know why your bank rarely accepts checks bearing two or more endorsements
– as collecting banks, they do not want to be liable as endorsers.
Atty. Christopher E. Cruz is a Full-Time Assistant Professor of the Commercial Law Department,
De La Salle University.
These article are contributed by the CBE Faculty in the column of Business Focus of Manila
Bulletin published August 2, 2004.
THE EFFECT OF FORGERY IN CHECKS
By: Atty. Christopher E. Cruz
Do you ever wonder why banks rarely accept checks bearing two or more endorsements
for deposit to your account? No law requires banks to reject checks bearing two or more
endorsements. In fact, the law encourages the free transfer and negotiation of checks to other
parties in accordance with the principle of “accumulation of secondary contracts” of negotiable
instruments. As checks and other negotiable instruments are endorsed from one person to
another, the endorsers become debtors of the holder of the check. Thus, the more debtors there
are, the greater are the chances that the holder of the check can collect payment. If the law
allows numerous endorsements on checks, why then does your bank rarely honor checks
bearing two or more endorsements? The reason is because banks may also be endorsers.
Let us consider a hypothetical case: Jojo draws a check payable to the order of Manny
as payee with ABC bank as drawee. Without Manny’s knowledge, Ronald steals the check and
forges Manny’s signature, making it appear that Manny endorsed it to him. Ronald then
endorses the check and deposits the same in his own savings account with XYZ bank. XYZ
bank then presents the check for payment with ABC bank. ABC bank pays the amount to XYZ
bank which, in turn, credits it to the account of Ronald. Thereupon, forger Ronald withdraws the
amount and goes into hiding. In this case, who bears the loss, the drawer (Manny), the drawee
bank (ABC bank) or the collecting bank (XYZ bank)?
Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a forged signature in a check,
whether it be that of the drawer or the payee, is wholly inoperative and no one can gain title to
the instrument through it. A person whose signature was forged was never a party and never
consented to the contract. Thus, a forged endorsement does not operate as the payee’s
endorsement. However, this rule does not apply to a party who is precluded from setting up
forgery or want of authority. Who are these parties? They are those who warrant or admit the
genuineness of the forged signature and those who by their acts, silence or negligence, are
barred from setting up forgery. An endorser is an example of a party who is precluded from
setting up forgery as he warrants, among other things, that “the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be” (Sec. 65 (a), Negotiable Instruments Law).
Let us now apply the aforesaid rules to the present case. As between the drawer Jojo
and the drawee ABC bank, the latter is liable for the loss. Under the circumstances, ABC banką“is under strict liability to pay the check only to the order of Jojo as reflected on the face of the
check. Payment under the forged endorsement of Manny is not to Jojo’s order. By paying a
party other than to the order of Jojo, ABC bank failed to comply with the terms of the check. It
violated its duty to charge Jojo’s account only according to his order. Thus, as a general rule,
ABC bank may not debit Jojo’s account and must re-credit the amount of the check to his
account. However, if ABC bank can prove that Jojo substantially contributed to the making of
the forged signature, the latter is precluded from setting up forgery.
However, all is not lost for ABC bank since it was not Jojo’s signature that was forged
but Manny’s. In cases involving forged endorsements, the drawee ABC bank may not debit the
account of the drawer but may generally pass liability back through the collection chain to the
party who took it from the forger and, of course, to the forger himself, if available (Associated
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 620). Thus, ABC bank may seek reimbursement from
XYZ bank. Since Manny’s signature was forged, XYZ bank had no right to be paid by ABC
Bank. Furthermore, under Sec. 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a collecting bank like
XYZ Bank that endorses a check bearing a forged signature and presents it to the drawee ABC
bank is liable as an endorser. Thus, XYZ warrants the genuineness of all prior signatures and is
precluded from setting up forgery or want of authority. Thus, as between the drawer, the drawee
and the collecting bank, the collecting bank is ultimately liable for the loss.
Since the drawee ABC Bank is liable to the drawer Jojo, and the collecting bank XYZ
Bank, in turn, is liable to the drawee ABC Bank, can Jojo be allowed to directly collect from XYZ
Bank to simplify matters? Negative. There is no legal relationship between Jojo and XYZ Bank.
Jojo is not a client of XYZ Bank. While the procedure may be simpler, this legal shortcut is not
permissible.
You now know why your bank rarely accepts checks bearing two or more endorsements
– as collecting banks, they do not want to be liable as endorsers.
Atty. Christopher E. Cruz is a Full-Time Assistant Professor of the Commercial Law Department,
De La Salle University.
These article are contributed by the CBE Faculty in the column of Business Focus of Manila
Bulletin published August 2, 2004.
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
my first week
My dad said that second year in lawschool is the point of no return. I am officially enrolled and is about to start my second week of law school funk as a second year student. Juggling 9 subjects is not an easy task, and i am not allowed to give up.
Heavy subjects include the following:
Law on Property
Law on Registration of Land Titles and Deeds
Law on Labor Standards
Criminal Procedure
Negotiable Instruments
and minor subjects....
As a consolation, our school gave us brilliant teachers. And I actually like them... As opposed to our first year teachers, some of whom are really lazy, our professors right now are really really good... =)
Well, more updates when I am not very busy doing case digests.. Lol
Heavy subjects include the following:
Law on Property
Law on Registration of Land Titles and Deeds
Law on Labor Standards
Criminal Procedure
Negotiable Instruments
and minor subjects....
As a consolation, our school gave us brilliant teachers. And I actually like them... As opposed to our first year teachers, some of whom are really lazy, our professors right now are really really good... =)
Well, more updates when I am not very busy doing case digests.. Lol
Wednesday, May 09, 2007
Sophomoric Repertoire
Enrollment days is fast approaching. I still have not saved enough for the downpayment for my tuition fees. Anyway, I'm already at my second year. I had a tough first year experience specially in establishing new relationships at school and on learning new things.. And these new things are ought to be remembered because this will contribute much of the profession that i have chosen. it just makes me think that learning these things carry with it a big responsibility.
Wish me luck!
Wish me luck!
Thursday, November 16, 2006
Second Semester
Second Semester has already started. This is actually the first week of the rigorous law school that i have enrolled to.
I had good grades last semester. I got flat 1 on my constitutional law. Wow! And i just couldn't believe it!
Another five months to go before fully finishing first year. I hope i make it. New and tougher subjects will be taken this sem. Not to mention Obligations and Contracts, I have this class everyday!!!!
Wish me luck!
I had good grades last semester. I got flat 1 on my constitutional law. Wow! And i just couldn't believe it!
Another five months to go before fully finishing first year. I hope i make it. New and tougher subjects will be taken this sem. Not to mention Obligations and Contracts, I have this class everyday!!!!
Wish me luck!
Saturday, August 26, 2006
Sunday, July 09, 2006
Criminal Law
It's not easy being a law student. I think the toughest subject that i have now is CRIMINAL LAW!!!!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)