Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid?

Ruling:
Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect.
The Court dismissed petitioner’s motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees.

Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees.

(CLICK ON THE TITLE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE @LAWPHIL.NET)

Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987

Facts:
This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only.

Issues:
When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?

Ruling:
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

(CLICK THE TITLE OF THE CASE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT @LAWPHIL.NET)

Japan Airlines V. Asuncion (G.R No. 161730, January 28,2005) 449 SCRA 544

Digested by Ms. Karen Mae Gonzales

FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution, which affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635.
On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines’ (JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours.
During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight.
Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japan’s Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. Respondents were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals.

On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport.


Issue: Whether or not JAL is liable of breach of contract of carriage.

Side Issues:
• Whether or not JAL is liable for moral, exemplary damages,
• Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for attorney’s fee and cost of suit incurred (JAL counterclaim)

Ruling:

The court finds that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.

In the Respondents claim that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain to the immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that JAL did not exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications. JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents’ applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita.

Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney’s fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[17] There being no breach of contract nor proof that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner, there is no basis for the award of any form of damages.

Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been sufficiently proven that the amount pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for the accommodations provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of JAL.

However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JAL’s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The action was filed by respondents in utmost good faith and not manifestly frivolous. Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its contract. A person’s right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.[

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly, there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However, the dismissal for lack of merit of petitioner’s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, is SUSTAINED. No pronouncement as to costs

Dangwa Transportation Co. vs Court of Appeals GR No. 95582 October 1991

Facts:
On March 25, 1985, Pedrito Cudiamat was ran over by a bus operated by Dangwa Transportation Company, and driven by Theodore Lardizabal. Lardizabal, being reckless and negligent, has prematurely stepped on the accelerator of the bus just as when Cudiamat boarded the same. The sudden jerk movement caused Cudiamat to fall from the platform and was ran over by they bus. Moreover, the driver did not immediately brought the victim to the nearest hospital for medical attention.

Issue:
Whether or not the driver and bus company are liable for the death of P. Cudiamat.

Held:
They are liable.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

November 12, 2007

Tonight is going to be the first night of our classes this semester.. Last semester was really hell... The current fad was bombarded with 3.5 and reconsidered grades.. Luckily, i passed all subjects but i was not spared from the 3.5 grade.. Let me publish my grades here (nyahahah!)

Negotiable Instruments - 1.1
Law on Election - 1.6
Land Titles and Deeds - 2.0
Labor Standards - 2.4
Law on Natural Resources - 2.5
Property - 3.0
Criminal Procedure - 3.1
Law on Public Corporation - 3.1
Environmental Rights - 3.5

I had 9 subjects in all and it was really hell. The subject I dreaded most was Criminal Procedure and I was very happy and contented with the 3.1 final grade. I really thought that I would flunk on this subject. Our professor for Public Corporation and Environmental Rights was tough, too!! Damn, I couldn't imagine myself taking again his subjects... I was really lucky to pass all my subjects..

I'm currently enrolled full load this second semester with the following subjects:

Credit Transactions
Administrative Law
Civil Procedure
Transportation
Public International Law
Sales
Social Legislation
Ombudsman/Sandigan Law

8 subjects in all, a bit lighter that the previous semester's load.. Well, good luck to me and good luck to all other law students in UM! Ahehehe.. (--,)

Enrolment

Enrolment officially starts today.. Get ready with your downpayment of P2,300.00 for second year students.. Unfortunately, the grades aren't available yet (Nego pa lang ang available as of 9am 10-30-07).. Good luck!

CPA Board Exam October 2007 result

Check this out! Click the link below to download.

CPA Board Exam Passers

Land Titles: Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals; July 5, 1996

Facts:

The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.

The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.

Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

Issue:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.

Decision:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:

“Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.”

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.

CASE DIGEST: Congson vs NLRC

FACTS:

The case was originally filed by herein respondents Bargo et al against Congson, the former being hired as piece-rate workers responsible for the loading/unloading of tuna catch for Southern Fishing Industry owned by the latter.

In 1990, the piece-rate workers were replaced with a new set of workers because of their alleged refusal/resistance to the proposed reduction of their piece-rate payment per tuna (the former rate was P1.00 per tuna movement. The reduction was proposed because of the decrease in the volume of tuna catch). They filed for underpayment of wages, contending that their average monthly rate did not exceed P1000, plus non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.

The labor arbiter decided in favor of the workers and directed Congson to pay the monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in toto, thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. W/N THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SEPARATION PAY?

2. W/N THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES SHOULD INCLUDE THE VALUE OF TUNA LIVER AND INTESTINES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE REPONDENT WORKERS AS PART OF THEIR COMPENSATION?

HELD:

1. YES. There being a substantive proof that the respondent workers are to be reinstated by their employer, the award for separation pay is appropriate. Separation pay may be given when the employer-employee relationship is to so tainted that reinstatement would not prosper.

2. NO. Article 102 par.1 of the Labor Code states that: Forms of payment. No employer shall pay the wages of an employee by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than legal tender, even when expressly requested by the employee. Thus, the computation made by the labor arbiter in arriving at the money claims is correct.

why banks rarely accept checks with two or more endorsements?

I found this article really helpful for my Negotiale Instruments Law subject:

THE EFFECT OF FORGERY IN CHECKS
By: Atty. Christopher E. Cruz
Do you ever wonder why banks rarely accept checks bearing two or more endorsements
for deposit to your account? No law requires banks to reject checks bearing two or more
endorsements. In fact, the law encourages the free transfer and negotiation of checks to other
parties in accordance with the principle of “accumulation of secondary contracts” of negotiable
instruments. As checks and other negotiable instruments are endorsed from one person to
another, the endorsers become debtors of the holder of the check. Thus, the more debtors there
are, the greater are the chances that the holder of the check can collect payment. If the law
allows numerous endorsements on checks, why then does your bank rarely honor checks
bearing two or more endorsements? The reason is because banks may also be endorsers.
Let us consider a hypothetical case: Jojo draws a check payable to the order of Manny
as payee with ABC bank as drawee. Without Manny’s knowledge, Ronald steals the check and
forges Manny’s signature, making it appear that Manny endorsed it to him. Ronald then
endorses the check and deposits the same in his own savings account with XYZ bank. XYZ
bank then presents the check for payment with ABC bank. ABC bank pays the amount to XYZ
bank which, in turn, credits it to the account of Ronald. Thereupon, forger Ronald withdraws the
amount and goes into hiding. In this case, who bears the loss, the drawer (Manny), the drawee
bank (ABC bank) or the collecting bank (XYZ bank)?
Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a forged signature in a check,
whether it be that of the drawer or the payee, is wholly inoperative and no one can gain title to
the instrument through it. A person whose signature was forged was never a party and never
consented to the contract. Thus, a forged endorsement does not operate as the payee’s
endorsement. However, this rule does not apply to a party who is precluded from setting up
forgery or want of authority. Who are these parties? They are those who warrant or admit the
genuineness of the forged signature and those who by their acts, silence or negligence, are
barred from setting up forgery. An endorser is an example of a party who is precluded from
setting up forgery as he warrants, among other things, that “the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be” (Sec. 65 (a), Negotiable Instruments Law).
Let us now apply the aforesaid rules to the present case. As between the drawer Jojo
and the drawee ABC bank, the latter is liable for the loss. Under the circumstances, ABC bankഊis under strict liability to pay the check only to the order of Jojo as reflected on the face of the
check. Payment under the forged endorsement of Manny is not to Jojo’s order. By paying a
party other than to the order of Jojo, ABC bank failed to comply with the terms of the check. It
violated its duty to charge Jojo’s account only according to his order. Thus, as a general rule,
ABC bank may not debit Jojo’s account and must re-credit the amount of the check to his
account. However, if ABC bank can prove that Jojo substantially contributed to the making of
the forged signature, the latter is precluded from setting up forgery.
However, all is not lost for ABC bank since it was not Jojo’s signature that was forged
but Manny’s. In cases involving forged endorsements, the drawee ABC bank may not debit the
account of the drawer but may generally pass liability back through the collection chain to the
party who took it from the forger and, of course, to the forger himself, if available (Associated
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 620). Thus, ABC bank may seek reimbursement from
XYZ bank. Since Manny’s signature was forged, XYZ bank had no right to be paid by ABC
Bank. Furthermore, under Sec. 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a collecting bank like
XYZ Bank that endorses a check bearing a forged signature and presents it to the drawee ABC
bank is liable as an endorser. Thus, XYZ warrants the genuineness of all prior signatures and is
precluded from setting up forgery or want of authority. Thus, as between the drawer, the drawee
and the collecting bank, the collecting bank is ultimately liable for the loss.
Since the drawee ABC Bank is liable to the drawer Jojo, and the collecting bank XYZ
Bank, in turn, is liable to the drawee ABC Bank, can Jojo be allowed to directly collect from XYZ
Bank to simplify matters? Negative. There is no legal relationship between Jojo and XYZ Bank.
Jojo is not a client of XYZ Bank. While the procedure may be simpler, this legal shortcut is not
permissible.
You now know why your bank rarely accepts checks bearing two or more endorsements
– as collecting banks, they do not want to be liable as endorsers.
Atty. Christopher E. Cruz is a Full-Time Assistant Professor of the Commercial Law Department,
De La Salle University.
These article are contributed by the CBE Faculty in the column of Business Focus of Manila
Bulletin published August 2, 2004.